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PRIVACY AND DIGNITY AT THE END OF LIFE:
PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF MONTANANS
TO CHOOSE AID IN DYING*
Kathryn L. Tucker**
I. INTRODUCTION
Could a state version of the landmark federal cases Vacco v.
Quill1 and Washington v. Glucksberg2 succeed in Montana? Yes.
Such a case would likely assert that mentally competent, termi-
nally ill Montanans have a right protected under the Montana
State Constitution's guarantees of privacy and dignity to choose to
control their own deaths by obtaining medications from their phy-
sicians for this purpose.
A number of factors suggest that protecting Montanans'
choice to receive aid in dying is likely to be recognized by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court under the Montana Constitution: (1) the lan-
guage of the state constitution, specifically the explicit guarantees
of privacy and dignity;3 (2) state constitutional precedent; (3) de-
velopments in Oregon (the only state to have yet legalized aid in
dying) under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act;4 (4) the growing
societal acceptance for this end-of-life option; and (5) Montana's
demonstrated commitment to ensuring that all terminally ill
Montanans receive good end-of-life care, including excellent pain
and symptom management.
* Editors' Note: This Article is based in part on the author's speech, Privacy, Dignity, and Patient
Choice at the End of Life, presented at the Montana Law Review's Honorable James R. Browning
Symposium, The Right to Privacy, held at The University of Montana School of Law on October 11-13,
2006.
** J.D., Director of Legal Affairs, Compassion and Choices, Affiliate Professor of Law, Lewis and
Clark School of Law. The author specially thanks Megan Hughes, J.D. Candidate 2009, Harvard Law
School, for her assistance in editing and revising, and Jessie Lundberg, J.D. Candidate 2008, The Uni-
versity of Montana School of Law, for her assistance in researching Montana's unique right to privacy.
1. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (holding that New York's ban on assisted suicide
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
2. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that the right to assistance in
committing suicide was not a fundamental liberty interest and that the State of Washing-
ton's ban on assisted suicide was rationally related to several governmental interests).
3. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-
being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest."); Id. at § 4 ("The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws.").
4. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800-127.897 (West 2005).
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II. MONTANA'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The people of Montana ratified a new state constitution in
1972 that included an explicit right to privacy. The Montana Con-
stitution states that the right to privacy is "essential to the well-
being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the show-
ing of a compelling state interest."5 Since its ratification, the
Montana Supreme Court has consistently and unequivocally held
that the Montana Constitution provides broader protection than
the U.S. Constitution. As the court explained in State v. Burns,6
"Montana adheres to one of the most stringent protection of its
citizens' right to privacy in the country."7
Three years later, in State v. Bullock,8 the court reiterated
that Montana provides a greater protection of the right to privacy,
noting the significance of the explicit constitutional language cre-
ating it. 9 The U.S. Constitution contains no such explicit right;
instead the U.S. Supreme Court has inferred it from the penum-
bras of the First and Fourth Amendments. 10 The Montana Con-
stitution, on the other hand, expressly guarantees a right of indi-
vidual privacy that "shall not be infringed without the showing of
a compelling state interest."11
As early as 1984, the Montana Supreme Court applied Mon-
tana's broader protection to individuals' right of privacy in search-
and-seizure cases, departing from the lower federal standard of
protection. In State v. Solis,12 the court unhesitatingly rejected
federal precedent that allowed government officials to record con-
versations without the other participant's knowledge. Instead,
the court turned to Montana's privacy provision and held that it
protected the defendant's expectation that his conversation would
be private and would not be recorded without his consent. 13
5. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
6. State v. Burns, 830 P.2d 1318 (Mont. 1992).
7. Id. at 1320.
8. State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61 (Mont. 1995).
9. Id. at 75.
10. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that "specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance"). These rights are protected from infringement by the states
through the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
11. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
12. State v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1984).
13. Id. at 521-22.
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Twenty years ago, in Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Service,14 the
Montana Supreme Court categorized privacy as a fundamental
right that triggers a strict scrutiny analysis in an equal protection
challenge. 15 Likewise, in State v. Siegal,'6 the court applied strict
scrutiny to a government intrusion on the privacy right.' 7 Thus,
in Montana, any infringement on the right to privacy is subject to
the highest level of review, requiring demonstration of a compel-
ling governmental interest, narrowly tailored in its means so as to
achieve that interest, and only that interest.' 8
Montana's dignity' 9 and equal protection 20 clauses, like its
privacy clause, are also broader than their federal counterparts
and are treated as fundamental rights.2' Montana's dignity
clause states that "[t]he dignity of the human being is inviolable.
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws." 22
Therefore any infringement of an individual's dignity or equal pro-
tection under the law, like the right to privacy, also triggers the
court's highest level of scrutiny and protection. 23
A significant line of precedent interprets the privacy clause as
broadly protecting individual autonomy over one's physical per-
son. Three years ago, in deciding whether a plaintiff can be com-
pelled to submit to a painful and burdensome medical examina-
tion in Simms v. Montana Eighteenth Judicial District,24 the court
held that the personal autonomy element of privacy must take
14. Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 744 P.2d 895 (Mont. 1987).
15. Id. at 897. when a right that is "less than fundamental is infringed upon by classi-
fication," it triggers only rational basis review, a lower level of scrutiny which requires the
government to demonstrate "a legitimate governmental objective bear[ing] a rational rela-
tionship to [the] discriminatory classification." Id.
16. State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176 (Mont. 1997).
17. Id. at 184, overruled in part, State v. Kuneff, 970 P.2d 556, 559 (Mont. 1998) (citing
State v. Pastos, 887 P.2d 199, 202 (Mont. 1994) (holding a governmental intrusion of pri-
vacy requires a compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to effectuate only
that interest)).
18. Id. at 184.
19. Mont. Const. art. II, § 4.
20. Id.
21. Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872, 882-83 (Mont. 2003) (holding that individual dignity
is a fundamental right under the Montana Constitution); Snetsinger v. Mont. U. Sys., 104
P.3d 445, 452 (Mont. 2004). The court held that a state university policy denying insurance
coverage to employees' same-sex partners violates the state constitution's guarantee of
equal protection because Montana's equal protection clause provides more protection than
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 449.
22. Mont. Const, art. II, § 4.
23. Snetsinger, 104 P.3d at 449-50 (discussing the levels of scrutiny a court uses when
addressing an equal protection argument, noting that strict scrutiny analysis is used when
addressing a fundamental right infringement).
24. Simms v. Mont. 18th Jud. Dist. Ct., 68 P.3d 678 (Mont. 2003).
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into account the individual's "inalienable right to the integrity of,
and personal autonomy over, his body."25
The Montana Supreme Court first recognized a "personal au-
tonomy component" as part of the state right to privacy in its 1997
case, Gryczan v. State.26 There the court acknowledged that the
right to privacy is fundamental, 27 and expanded that right to in-
clude consensual same-gender sexual conduct, 28 even though U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence at the time denied federal recogni-
tion of such a right.29 The Montana Supreme Court found that the
State lacked the required compelling interest in prohibiting such
conduct, and therefore the law failed under strict scrutiny.30
In 1999, the court decided a case with even more significant
ramifications for the question of whether an individual's access to
physician aid in dying is part of the fundamental right to privacy,
dignity, and equal protection. In Armstrong v. State,3 1 the court
held that the Montana Constitution's privacy clause protects a wo-
man's right to choose an abortion and an abortion provider, be-
cause it broadly guarantees each individual the right "to make
medical judgments affecting her or his bodily integrity and health
... free from the interference of the government."3 2 The court
further held that the state constitutional right of individual pri-
vacy "requires the government to leave us alone in all these most
personal and private matters."33
Specifically, the court stated, "if the right to privacy includes
anything, it... encompasses a woman's choice of whether or not
to end her pregnancy."34 Furthermore, the court held that
"[ilmplicit in this right of procreative autonomy is a woman's
moral right and moral responsibility to decide ... what her preg-
25. Id. at 685.
26. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 126 (Mont. 1997) (holding Montana's right to pri-
vacy extends to consensual same-gendered sexual activity because the state has no compel-
ling interest in prohibiting such activity).
27. Id. at 122. The court noted that the right to privacy is "perhaps, one of the most
important rights guaranteed to the citizens of this State, and its separate textual protec-
tion in our Constitution reflects Montanans' historical abhorrence and distrust of excessive
governmental interference in their personal lives." Id. at 125.
28. Id. at 122.
29. Id. at 121 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J. dis-
senting)).
30. Id. at 125-26.
31. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999).
32. Id. at 375.
33. Id. at 383.
34. Id. at 376.
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nancy demands of her in the context of her individual values, her
beliefs as to the sanctity of life, and her personal situation."35
Upon determining that a woman's right to terminate a preg-
nancy constituted a fundamental right of privacy, dignity, and
equal protection, the court found that a Montana law requiring
pre-viability abortions to be performed by a physician did not pass
strict scrutiny review because, although the statute was narrowly
drawn, the State failed to show it had a compelling interest for the
law in the first place.36 The court stated,
The government can demonstrate no compelling interest for legis-
lating on the basis of any sectarian doctrine nor may the state in-
fringe individual liberty and personal autonomy because of
majoritarian demands to safeguard some intrinsic value unrelated
to the protection of the rights and interest of persons with constitu-
tional status.37
Finally, the court held that the State had no greater interest
in a pregnancy a woman sought to terminate than in one she
chose to carry to term.38 This is critical, the court said, because a
government that has the power to pass laws prohibiting abortion
also has the power to pass laws requiring it.39 In other words,
either such a personal decision is none of the government's busi-
ness, or it is wholly its business, for better or worse.
As a reminder that such a scenario is not unimaginable, the
court referenced Buck v. Bell, 40 a 1927 U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion holding that involuntary sterilization of mentally disabled
adults was constitutional.4 1 The Montana Supreme Court noted
that this caveat should be even more alarming to those who would
oppose a certain right, as the possibility of the government impos-
ing that right as a requirement "is no more remote than a change
in prevailing political ideology." 42
Armstrong demonstrates the State's strong presumption in
favor of the individual's right to privacy over his or her physical
being, consistent with the strict scrutiny analysis applied in that
case. Rather than characterizing an act like terminating a preg-
nancy as an act a woman may not commit unless the State gives
35. Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 382.
37. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 382.
38. Id. at 377.
39. Id.
40. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
41. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 377-78 (citing Buck, 274 U.S. at 207).
42. Id. at 377.
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her that right, the court placed the burden on the State to show a
compelling interest justifying its intrusion.43
Based on Armstrong, this presumption of one's control over
his or her body would likely extend to the choice to receive aid in
dying. Like a woman faced with the difficult decision whether to
terminate a pregnancy, a terminally ill individual similarly has
that same "moral right and moral responsibility" to determine
what the ongoing pain and debilitation of her illness demands of
her, "in the context of her individual values, her beliefs as to the
sanctity of life, and her personal situation."4
The court in Armstrong could find no compelling state inter-
est to infringe on a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy
with the provider of her choice. Principled application of prece-
dent suggests the court would likewise be unable to find a compel-
ling state interest to infringe on a terminally ill person's choice to
ease and possibly hasten the end of his or her own life in a digni-
fied manner. The court made it clear that neither "majoritarian
demands" nor "any sectarian doctrine" may justify the state's in-
fringement on the privacy right.45
The court's warning regarding the double-edged sword of rec-
ognizing a compelling state interest in infringing a privacy right
applies with equally chilling implications to the right to aid in dy-
ing. As the court reminded us in Armstrong, either the State has
no interest in an individual's decision, or it has an ever-present
interest that can be used to compel choice in either direction. 46 If
the State can prohibit an individual's choice of aid in dying, it can
require it. As the latter flies in the face of widely held ideas re-
garding personal autonomy and the right to refuse treatment, so
the former must be equally repugnant to Montana's constitutional
right to privacy.
Interestingly, one of Montana's most recent cases addressing
the right to privacy affected an individual's right to die, albeit in-
directly. In State v. Dawson,47 the court held that a prisoner fac-
ing the death penalty had the right to withdraw his appeal so long
as he was mentally competent. 48 The court further held- that, due
to his right to privacy, the prisoner could refuse additional medi-
43. Id. at 375.
44. Id. at 377.
45. Id. at 382.
46. Id. at 377.
47. State v. Dawson, 133 P.3d 236 (Mont. 2006).
48. Id. at 249.
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cal examinations even though such examinations might discover
evidence that he was not competent to withdraw his appeal. 49
It is not suggested here that Dawson addresses an individ-
ual's right to aid in dying under the privacy right of the Montana
Constitution. However, the case nonetheless provides a glimpse
at the court's unwavering and absolute respect for the right of in-
dividuals to exercise autonomy over their physical bodies, even if
that exercise makes the individuals' pending deaths certain.
Montana legal commentators, notably Scott Fisk in The Last
Best Place to Die: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Montana's Con-
stitutional Right to Personal Autonomy Privacy,50 have speculated
that such a case brought by a plaintiff seeking aid in dying has a
good chance of success in light of the state constitution's text and
precedent. Since publication of the Fisk article, additional
favorable court opinions51 and commentary 52 have been pub-
lished.
In addition, more than nine years of data from Oregon's im-
plementation of its Death with Dignity Act now exist. The data
confirm that allowing dying patients to choose aid in dying poses
no risks to patients, doctors or society.53 This finding is signifi-
cant because the argument that risks will arise has been central
to other states' defenses of laws prohibiting what some have la-
beled "assisted suicide. ' 54 The term "assisted suicide" is not used
49. Id.
50. Scott A. Fisk, The Last Best Place to Die: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Montana's
Constitutional Right to Personal Autonomy Privacy, 59 Mont. L. Rev. 301 (1998).
51. E.g. Armstrong, 989 P.2d 364; Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872 (Mont. 2003); Snetsinger
v. Mont. U. Sys., 104 P.3d 445 (Mont. 2004).
52. James E. Dallner & D. Scott Manning, Death with Dignity in Montana, 65 Mont. L.
Rev. 309 (2004). The authors point out that "[tlhe Montana Constitution was drafted with
explicit acknowledgment of the changes which have occurred in the past century and with
the clear intention to replace obsolete legal concepts." Id. at 337. Thus, the Montana Su-
preme Court, instead of looking to the past and to history as the U.S. Supreme Court did in
Glucksberg, would base "its decisions on a constitution which exists because the ways of the
past were found to have become outmoded and inadequate." Id. at 337-38. The authors
contend that a claim under the right to individual dignity may be more likely to succeed
than a claim under the privacy clause, as the right of individual dignity is described as
"inviolable" and is thus less likely to be "outweighed by a competing state interest." Id. at
339.
53. Infra nn. 61-74.
54. Kathryn L. Tucker, The Chicken and the Egg: The Pursuit of Choice for a Human
Hastened-Death as a Catalyst for Improved End-of-Life Care; Improved End-of-Life Care as
a Precondition for Legalization of Assisted Dying, 60 N.Y. U. Annual Survey Am. L. 355,
366 (2004) (discussing the significance of states' argument regarding risk, and how availa-
ble data might undermine any such argument).
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in Oregon's Death with Dignity Act and is being increasingly re-
jected by medical experts. 55
One thing is certain: when the 1972 Constitutional Conven-
tion delegates included an explicit right of privacy in the Montana
Constitution, they intentionally left it broad and open for future
courts to interpret.56 The court in Armstrong concluded that,
while the right to privacy may not be absolute,
no final boundaries can be drawn around the personal autonomy
component of the right of individual privacy. It is ... as narrow as
is necessary to protect against a specific unlawful infringement of
individual dignity and personal autonomy by the government ...
and as broad as are the State's ever innovative attempts to dictate
in matters of conscience, to define individual values, and to con-
demn those found to be socially repugnant or politically unpopu-
lar.5 7
III. CHOICE OF AID IN DYING IN OREGON 5 8
Oregon is the only state to date to explicitly allow a mentally
competent, terminally ill patient to receive medications from an
attending physician that the patient could consume to bring about
a peaceful and dignified death.
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act 59 ("Dignity Act") was
passed in 1994 through Oregon's initiative process. 60 The Dignity
Act establishes tightly controlled procedures under which a com-
petent, terminally ill adult, who is under the care of an attending
physician, may obtain a prescription for medication to allow the
patient to control the time, place, and manner of his or her own
impending death. 61 The attending physician must determine that
the patient is suffering from a terminal disease.62 To qualify as
having a "terminal disease," a person must have "an incurable and
irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will,
55. Infra nn. 100-04.
56. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 374.
57. Id. at 375.
58. Most of Section III was first published in the Willamette Law Review. Kathryn L.
Tucker, Federalism in the Context of Assisted Dying, 41 Willamette L. Rev. 863, 867-71
(2005).
59. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800-127.897 (West 2005).
60. Implementation was obstructed for several years by a lawsuit brought by opponents
who argued that a law permitting terminally ill patients to choose physician assistance in
dying denied the terminally ill equal protection of the laws. The Ninth Circuit dismissed
the case on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Lee v. Or., 107 F.3d 1382,
1386-90 (9th Cir. 1997).
61. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.805.
62. Id. at § 127.815.
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within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six
months."63
The attending physician must also determine that the patient
is mentally competent and an Oregon resident, and inform the pa-
tient requesting such medication of the physician's diagnoses and
prognoses of the patient's condition, the risks and probable results
of taking the medication, and alternatives to taking his or her own
life, including, but not limited to, hospice care and pain relief.64
As an added precaution, a consulting physician must confirm the
attending physician's medical opinion.65
Once a request from a qualifying patient has been properly
documented and witnessed, and all waiting periods have ex-
pired, 66 the attending physician may prescribe, but not adminis-
ter, medication to enable the patient to end his or her life in a
humane and dignified manner. The Dignity Act immunizes physi-
cians and pharmacists who act in compliance with its comprehen-
sive procedures from civil or criminal sanctions, and from any pro-
fessional disciplinary actions based on that conduct. 67
The Dignity Act also requires healthcare providers to file re-
ports with the State documenting their actions.68 To date, the Or-
egon Department of Human Services' Office of Disease Prevention
and Epidemiology has issued nine annual reports that present
and evaluate the state's experience with the Dignity Act.6 9 Ore-
gon's experience with legal aid in dying has been studied and dis-
cussed by a closely watching nation. These reports have shown
that the dire predictions of those initially opposed to the Dignity
Act are baseless. The data demonstrate that the option of aid in
dying has not been unwillingly forced upon those who are poor,
uneducated, uninsured or otherwise disadvantaged. 70 In fact, the
studies show just the opposite. For example, the Eighth Annual
Report found that a higher level of education is strongly associated
with the use of aid in dying; those with a baccalaureate degree or
63. Id. at § 127.800(12).
64. Id. at § 127.800(7).
65. Id. at §§ 127.800(8), 127.820.
66. Id. at §§ 127.840, 127.845, 127.850.
67. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.885.
68. Id. at § 127.865.
69. Or. Dept. of Health Serv., Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, http://oregon.gov/DHS/
ph/pas/index.shtml (accessed Feb. 23, 2007).
70. Or. Dept. of Hum. Res., Oregon's Death with Dignity Act: The First Year's Experi-
ence 7, http://oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/docs/yearl.pdf (Feb. 18, 1999) ("Patients who chose
physician-assisted suicide were not disproportionately poor (as measured by Medicaid sta-
tus), less educated, lacking in insurance coverage, or lacking in access to hospice care.").
325
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higher were 7.9 times more likely than those without a high school
diploma to choose aid in dying. 71 The Eighth Annual Report also
found that 99% of patients who opted for aid in dying during the
first eight years had either private health insurance or Medicare/
Medicaid, and 92% were enrolled in hospice care.7 2
Furthermore, the Annual Reports demonstrate that use of aid
in dying is limited. During the first nine years in which this was
a legal option, a total of only 292 Oregonians chose it.73 Although
there has been a gradual increase in the rate of those opting for
aid in dying, the overall rate remains low: the thirty-eight termi-
nally ill adults who chose this option in 2005 represented only
twelve deaths for every 10,000 Oregonians who died that year. 74
The State of Vermont recently concluded, after a thorough review
of the Oregon experience, that "it is [quite] apparent from credible
sources in and out of Oregon that the Death with Dignity Act has
not had an adverse impact on end-of-life care and in all probability
has enhanced the other options." 75 Individual observers have
reached similar conclusions: "I worried about people being pres-
sured to do this. But this data confirms, for the seventh year, that
the policy in Oregon is working. There is no evidence of abuse or
coercion or misuse of the policy."76
Indeed, rather than posing a risk to patients or the medical
profession, the Dignity Act has galvanized significant improve-
ments in the care of dying Oregonians. Oregon doctors report that
since the passage of the Dignity Act, efforts have been made to
improve their ability to provide adequate end-of-life care.77 These
efforts include improving their knowledge of the use of pain medi-
cations for the terminally ill, improving their ability to recognize
71. Or. Dept. of Hum. Servs., Eighth Annual Report on Oregon's Death with Dignity Act
12, http://oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pastdocs/year8.pdf (Mar. 2007) [hereinafter Eighth Annual
Report].
72. Id. at 23.
73. Or. Dept. of Hum. Servs., Ninth Annual Report on Oregon's Death with Dignity Act
1, http://oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/docs/year9.pdf (Mar. 2007).
74. Eighth Annual Report, supra n. 71, at 5.
75. Robin Lunge, Maria Royle & Michael Slater, Oregon's Death with Dignity Law and
Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Factual Disputes, 2004 at 26, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/
reports04DeathDeath With_- DignityReport.htm (accessed Mar. 17, 2007).
76. William McCall, Assisted-Suicide Cases Down in '04, The Columbian (Vancouver,
Wash.) C2 (Mar. 11, 2005) (quoting Arthur Caplan, Director of the Center for Bioethics at
the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine).
77. Id.
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depression and other psychiatric disorders, and more frequently
referring their patients to hospice programs. 78
In light of the Oregon experience, even previously staunch op-
ponents have recognized that continued opposition to such a law
can only be based on personal moral or religious grounds.79
In sum, the data demonstrate that making the option of aid in
dying available, far from posing any hazard to patients or the
practice of medicine, has galvanized improvements in end-of-life
care, benefiting all terminally ill Oregonians.
IV. GROWING SOCIETAL ACCEPTANCE FOR AID IN DYING
It is now possible to argue persuasively that there is growing
societal acceptance for aid in dying.8 0 This can be influential to
courts considering whether to extend constitutional protection to
certain conduct, as seen recently in the U.S. Supreme Court's
Lawrence v. Texas decision.81
A poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in November
2005, and released in January 2006, found that 60% of Americans
"believe a person has a moral right to end their life if they are
suffering great pain and have no hope of improvement," and 53%
"believe a person has a moral right to end their life if suffering
from an incurable disease."8 2 Nearly half of Americans, 46%, sup-
port laws allowing doctors to prescribe lethal medication to assist
terminally ill patients in ending their lives.8 3 The percentage of
Americans supporting a moral right of individuals suffering great
pain with no hope of improvement to end their lives has risen
78. Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Book Review, 293 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 501 (2005) (re-
viewing Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care and Patient Choice
(Timothy E. Quill & Margaret Battin eds., JAMA 2005)) ("Indeed, one of the unexpected yet
undeniable consequences of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act permitting physician aid-in-
dying is that 'many important and measurable improvements in end-of-life care' occurred
following the Act's implementation. Rather than becoming the brutal abattoir for hapless
patients that some critics predicted, the state is a leader in providing excellent and compas-
sionate palliative care.").
79. See Daniel Lee, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Conservative Critique of Intervention,
33 Hastings Ctr. Rpt. 17-19 (Jan.-Feb. 2003).
80. Public opinion polls suggest that this is the case. Infra nn. 82-98.
81. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 570-71 (2003). See also Laurence H. Tribe, Law-
rence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev.
1894, 1901 (2004); Diana Hassel, Sex and Death: Lawrence's Liberty and Physician-As-
sisted Suicide, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1003 (2007).
82. The Pew Research Ctr., More Americans Discussing-and Planning-End-of-Life
Treatment: Strong Public Support for the Right to Die 8, http://people-press.org/reports/
display.php3?ReportID=266 (accessed Mar. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Pew Research Ctr. Poll].
83. Id. at 2, 5.
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nearly twenty percentage points since 1975, although most of the
increase (41% to 55%) occurred between 1975 and 1990.84
Similarly, the poll found that support for the moral right of a
patient to end his or her life has increased in the United States
since 1990.85 Total support for the moral right to end life when a
patient has an incurable disease has increased from 49% in 1990
to 53% in 2005.86 Total support for the moral right to end life
when a patient is suffering great pain and has no hope for im-
provement has increased from 55% in 1990 to 60% in 2005.87
There has been a particularly striking increase in support for the
moral right of a patient to end life among those aged fifty and
older. The support for a moral right to end life when a patient has
an incurable disease has increased from 42% in 1990 to 56% in
2006 among participants aged fifty to sixty-four."" In the same
age group, the support for a moral right to end life when a patient
is suffering great pain and has no hope of improvement has in-
creased from 47% in 1990 to 62% in 2005.89 Among those sixty-
five and older, support for the moral right to end life when a pa-
tient has an incurable disease has increased from 33% in 1990 to
45% in 2005, and support for the moral right to end life when a
patient is suffering great pain and has no hope for improvement
has increased from 39% in 1990 to 50% in 2005. 90
A 2005 Gallup poll released in May 2005 found that 75% of
Americans believe that doctors should be allowed to aid termi-
nally ill people in hastening their deaths.91 A Harris poll released
in April 2005 found that 70% of American adults favor a law that
would "allow doctors to comply with the wishes of a dying patient
in severe distress who asks to have his or her life ended," up from
65% in 2001 (although less than the 73% in favor in 1993).92 The
same poll found that 67% of American adults would like their
84. Id. at 12.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id.
88. Pew Research Ctr. Poll, supra n. 82, at 3.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id.
91. David W. Moore, Three in Four Americans Support Euthanasia, http://www.gallup
poll.com/content/?CI=16333 (May 17, 2005).
92. Harris Interactive, Majorities of U.S. Adults Favor Euthanasia and Physician-As-
sisted Suicide by More than Two-to-One, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/
index.asp?PID=561 (Apr. 27, 2005).
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states to pass laws similar to the Oregon Death with Dignity Act,
up from 61% in 2001.9 3
A 2006 California Field poll found that 70% of all California
adults believe "incurably ill patients should have the right to ask
for and get life-ending medication."94 Sixty-two percent of Califor-
nians "would want their doctor to be able to assist them in dying"
if they were "terminally ill and expected to die within six
months."95 In previous years, between 67% and 72% of Californi-
ans would like the option of aid in dying if faced with this situa-
tion. Support in California for aid in dying has ranged from 64%
to 75% in eight polls taken between 1979 and 2006.96
A study by Wake Forest University researchers published in
2005 found that 58% of American adults disagreed with the state-
ment that "they would trust their doctor less if 'euthanasia were
legal [and] doctors were allowed to help patients die.' "97 Nearly
60% of doctors themselves believe they should be "legally permit-
ted to dispense prescriptions for life-ending drugs to terminally ill
patients who request them," according to a poll released in Octo-
ber 2005.98 While doctors support legal aid in dying at lower rates
than patients, support among doctors increased two percentage
points since a February 2005 poll.99
The medical community also reflects society's changing per-
ception of a patient's choice to use physician aid in dying. Medical
experts have discussed in detail why the terms "suicide" or "as-
sisted suicide" are inappropriate when discussing the choice of a
mentally competent, terminally ill patient to seek medications
that he or she could consume to bring about a peaceful and digni-
fied death. 100 The American Psychological Association has recog-
nized that "[i]t is important to remember that the reasoning on
93. Id.
94. Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, Continued Support for Doctor-Assisted Suicide;
Most Would Want Their Physician to Assist Them if They Were Incurably Ill and Wanted to
Die 1-3, http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/RLS2188.pdf (Mar. 15, 2006).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Mark A. Hall, F. Trachtenberg & E. Dugan, The Impact on Patient Trust of Legalis-
ing Physician Aid in Dying, 31 J. Med. Ethics 693, 694 (2005).
98. Kevin B. O'Reilly, Doctors Favor Physician-Assisted Suicide Less than Patients Do;
But an Opinion Poll Shows Doctors' Support up 2 Percentage Points from a Poll Earlier
This Year, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/11/21/prsall2l.htm (Nov. 21, 2005).
99. Id.
100. See e.g. Charles F. McKhann, A Time to Die: The Place for Physician Assistance 4-5
(Yale U. Press 1999) (renowned oncologist and professor of medicine at Yale University
exploring the language issue extensively).
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which a terminally ill person (whose judgments are not impaired
by mental disorders) bases a decision to end his or her life is fun-
damentally different from the reasoning a clinically depressed
person uses to justify suicide."10 1
"Suicide" and the choice of a dying patient to hasten impend-
ing death in a peaceful and dignified manner are starkly different
from a mental health perspective. Profound psychological differ-
ences distinguish suicide from actions under the Dignity Act. As
one psychiatrist recently summarized,
The term "assisted suicide" is inaccurate and misleading with re-
spect to the DWDA [Death with Dignity Act]. These patients and
the typical suicide are opposites:
* The suicidal patient has no terminal illness but wants to die;
the DWDA patient has a terminal illness and wants to live.
* Typical suicides bring shock and tragedy to families and
friends; DWDA deaths are peaceful and supported by loved
ones.
* Typical suicides are secretive and often impulsive and violent.
Death in DWDA is planned; it changes only timing in a minor
way, but adds control in a major and socially approved way.
* Suicide is an expression of despair and futility; DWDA is a
form of affirmation and empowerment. 10 2
The Oregon Department of Human Services, which is vested
with the responsibility to report on the Dignity Act, recently
adopted the policy that it will no longer refer to aid in dying as
"assisted suicide" or "physician-assisted suicide." As explained by
a medical epidemiologist at the Department of Human Services, it
"probably has not been correct for us to be using this language all
along."10 3
This is consistent with the Dignity Act itself, which clearly
states that "[a] ctions taken in accordance with [the Act] shall not,
for any purpose, constitute suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing
or homicide, under the law."1 0 4 Similarly, the American Public
101. Br. of Amicus Curiae Coalition of Mental Health Prof. 17, Gonzales v. Or., 546 U.S.
243 (2006) (quoting Am. Psychol. Assn., Terminal Illness and Hastened Death Requests:
The Important Role of the Mental Health Professional 1 (1997)); see also, David M. Smith &
David Pollack, A Psychiatric Defense of Aid in Dying, 34 Community Mental Health J. 547,
548-49 (1998); Rhea K. Farberman, Terminal Illness and Hastened Death Requests: The
Important Role of the Mental Health Professional, 28 Prof. Psychol.: Research & Prac. 544,
545 (1997).
102. E. James Lieberman, Ltr. to the Ed., Death with Dignity, 41 Psychiatric News 29,
29 (2006) (available at "past issues", http://pn.psychiatryonline.org).
103. Kevin B. O'Reilly, Oregon Nixes Use of Term "Physician-Assisted Suicide", http://
www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/11/06/prscll06.htm (Nov. 6, 2006) (quoting Katrina
Hedberg, a DHS Public Health Division medical epidemiologist).
104. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.880 (West 2005).
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Health Association adopted a policy to this effect at its 2006 an-
nual meeting.10 5
Other professional societies are reaching the same conclusion
regarding terminology: the American Academy of Hospice and
Palliative Medicine adopted a policy on terminology used to dis-
cuss the choice made by a mentally competent, terminally ill pa-
tient to self-administer medication for the purpose of hastening
death, calling the practice "Physician-Assisted Death," and re-
jecting the term "Physician-Assisted Suicide" as "emotionally
charged" and less accurate. 10 6
V. MONTANA'S DEMONSTRATED COMMITMENT TO
EXCELLENT END-OF-LIFE CARE
Finally, when patients can expect good pain and symptom
management, judges are less likely to conclude that all that is re-
105. Am. Pub. Health Assn., Supporting Appropriate Language Used to Discuss End of
Life Choices, http://www.compassionandchoices.orgtpdfs/APHAPolicy.pdf (Nov. 8, 2006).
Similarly, the American College of Legal Medicine (ACLM) argued in an amicus brief sub-
mitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1996:
A. The Term "Physician-Assisted Suicide" Colors the Issue.
Semantics, of course, do not resolve the instant issue. Yet, the term "physi-
cian-assisted suicide" is arguably a misnomer that unfairly colors the issue, and
for some, evokes feelings of repugnance and immorality. The appropriateness of
the term is doubtful in several respects. First, neither the New York nor the
Washington statute at issue in these cases contain the phrase "physician-assisted
suicide.".. . Second, the word "suicide" itself is defined not only as the "taking of
one's own life" but also as the "destruction or ruin of one's own interests." As ex-
emplified in the discussion below, it seems inappropriate to characterize requests
for treatment that ends life, made by suffering, terminally-ill patients, as any form
of destruction or ruination of their interests. Assuming a patient's mental compe-
tence, and recognizing this Court's long-held commitment to the principles of per-
sonal autonomy and free will .... prescribing medication intended to end life in
the subject context serves-not destroys or ruins-a patient's interests. For these
reasons, ACLM questions whether the subject statutes even apply to the situation
in which a physician cares for a mentally-competent adult in the end-stages of a
terminal illness with medical treatment intended to end life. Notwithstanding
that fact, ACLM rejects the term "physician-assisted suicide," and instead refers
herein to the practice in question as "treatment intended to end life."
Br. of Amicus Curiae Am. College of Leg. Med. at 4-5, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)
(citation omitted).
106. Am. Acad. Hospice & Palliative Med., Policy on Physician-Assisted Death, http://
www.aahpm.org/positions/suicide.html (Feb. 14, 2007). This 2007 policy replaces an out-
dated policy adopted in 1997, which used the less accurate and "emotionally charged" term
"physician assisted suicide." Am. Acad. Hospice & Palliative Med., Policy on Comprehen-
sive End-of-Life Care and Physician-Assisted Suicide (Sept. 1, 1997) (available in Medical
Ethics: Codes, Opinions, and Statements 367 (Baruch L. Brody et al. eds., BNA Books
2000)).
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ally needed is simply better pain and symptom management. 10 7
Montana has long had the issue of pain management and pallia-
tive care in the public eye. The state created a high profile pain
management and palliative care program, initially known as the
Missoula Demonstration Project, led by a nationally prominent
palliative care clinician.' 08 The Project was established in 1996,
and was later renamed Life's End Institute, Missoula Demonstra-
tion Project.10 9 The Montana Board of Medical Examiners has
adopted a guideline promoting pain management, and a Joint Pol-
icy Statement of the Boards of Medical Examiners, Nursing, and
Pharmacy promoting pain management." 0 Additionally, the Leg-
islature has formed a Montana pain and symptom management
task force."'
VI. CONCLUSION
It is important to the nation, and the federalism experiment
invited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Glucksberg, to have a second
state join Oregon and serve as a "laboratory" for legalized aid in
dying.112 Montana is uniquely situated to become that second
state, as it has a rich, robust tradition of respecting individual lib-
erty, privacy and dignity under an unusually protective state Con-
stitution. That tradition, which has provided broad protection to
life-shaping life-course determinative decisions, ought to result in
the Montana Supreme Court embracing the right of mentally com-
petent terminally ill Montanans to choose aid in dying. Further,
the Montana Supreme Court can consider the issue with more
than nine years of data from the State of Oregon. The data inform
the analysis of whether recognition of a right to choose aid in dy-
ing would pose unacceptably high risks to patients or physicians,
outweighing the rights of patients to have access to this option.
Finally, Montana has a demonstrated commitment to providing
all terminally ill patients good end-of-life care, ensuring that no
107. See Tucker, supra n. 54, at 359-63.
108. Life's End Inst., History, http://www.lifes-end.org/about/ (accessed April 4, 2007).
The Institute was led by the respected palliative care physician Ira Byock. Id.
109. Id.
110. Mont. Bd. of Med. Examrs., Mont. Bd. of Nursing & Mont. Bd. of Pharm., Joint
Policy Statement: Statement of the Prescribing and Filling of Controlled Substances in
the Treatment of Chronic Pain, http://mt.gov/dli/bsdlicense/bsd-boards/med.board/pdf/
chronicjpain.pdf (accessed May 10, 2007).
111. Mont. Sen. Jt. Res. 28, 2005 Sess. 59th Leg. (Apr. 19, 2005).
112. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997).
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terminally ill Montanan need choose aid in dying due to inade-
quate pain and symptom management.
A fraction of dying patients, even with excellent pain and
symptom management, confront a prolonged dying process
marked by extreme suffering and deterioration. Some of these pa-
tients determine that hastening impending death is the better al-
ternative. Recognition of such a right would harm no one, and
would benefit both the relatively few patients in extremis who
would make use of it, and a great many more who would draw
comfort from knowing this option is available should their dying
process become intolerable to them.
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